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ABSTRACT

In order to clarify and define the subject matter of argumentation, this paper examines the two senses of argument identified by D. J. O'Keefe and then proposes a third sense of argument as another legitimate perspective in argumentation. As discussed in the paper, O'Keefe's two senses of argument are a thing people make and a kind of interaction people have. The third sense of argument proposed in the paper refers to the mental processes by which arguments occur within people and includes (1) the perceptual and inferential event of noticing an argument or the need for one, (2) the memorial processes of storage and retrieval of pertinent cognitive elements, (3) the information processing that is applied to the argument and its potential parts, (4) the creative energies that generate new arguments or responses to them, and (5) the productive abilities that give form to utterance. The paper examines the theories of Plato, Aristotle, C. A. Willard, B. R. Burleson, J. W. Wenzel, and C. Perlman, finding evidence of this sense of argument, and then reviews the features of the first two senses of argument, discovering that the third sense is useful in understanding them. In conclusion, the paper examines the S. Jackson and S. Jacobs program of research on conversational argument and finds that it is heavily dependent on the third sense of argument. (FL)

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On the Senses of "Argument"

By

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Abstract

This paper proposes that argument$_0$, the cognitive sense of "argument," join argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ as another legitimate perspective in argumentation. Argument$_0$ is briefly described, and then found to be present in the theories of Plato, Aristotle, Willard, Burleson, Wenzel and Perelman. The O'Keefe/Brockriede discussion is reviewed, and argument$_0$ is shown to be helpful in understanding the features of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. Finally, the Jacobs/Jackson program of research on conversational argument is examined, and is discovered to depend heavily on argument$_0$. The objections made by these writers to psychologism in argumentation are considered and answered.

Paper presented to the annual meeting of the Western Speech Communication Association, Denver, February 1982.

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On the Senses of "Argument"

Every academic speciality is inevitably drawn to define, clarify and re-define its central subject matter. For argumentation, the seminal paper of this type is O'Keefe's (1977), in which he distinguishes two senses of "argument." Argument$_1$ is a thing people make, as when an editorialist argues that some public policy is wrong. Argument$_2$ is a kind of interaction people have, as when two friends argue about where to have lunch. O'Keefe's distinctions are commonly seen as laying out in broad terms the defining features of argument, and are consequently exerting appreciable influence on our developing field. Argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ have become essential touchstones in generating, describing or evaluating argumentation research and theory. Though some other useful sets of distinctions have appeared recently (Wenzel, 1980; McKerrow, 1980; Trapp, 1981), O'Keefe's two senses continue to be our dominant conceptual scheme.

Of course, this is not to say that no further work remains to be done. O'Keefe himself has recently written an important elaborative essay (O'Keefe, in press). An early reviewer of that paper judges that even with the most recent emendations, O'Keefe's distinctions are only preliminaries which need to be revised to be more useful to the audience of argumentation theorists (Burleson, 1981, p. 962). Another commentator, on reading O'Keefe's new essay, continues to call for "an organic conception of argument in which the 'senses' are collapsed in on-going discourse" (McKerrow, 1981, p. 980; also see McKerrow, 1980). That the two senses can actually be "collapsed" seems doubtful since the differences between argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ appear to be both clear and important (compare Burleson, 1979a, 140-141; and Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 127-128). Nonetheless I sympathise with the desire to explore the elements common to both kinds of argument, and offer this essay as an

attempt to identify some of that common ground.

Briefly, my thesis is this: A third sense of argument is necessary to a complete understanding of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. This is the cognitive sense of argument, which refers to the mental processes by which arguments occur within people (Hample, 1980a). These mental processes encompass everything involved in "thinking out" an argument: the perceptual and inferential event of noticing an argument or the need for one; the memorial processes of storage and retrieval of pertinent cognitive elements; the information processing which is applied to the argument and its potential parts; the creative energies which generate new arguments or responses to them; and the productive abilities which give form to utterance. Though I have tried elsewhere to summarize the nature of much of this process (Hample, 1979), for the most part I have concentrated on the receiver's information processing. Some of this information processing can be modeled after the syllogism, and we have no trouble labeling this as "reasoning" (e.g., Hample, 1981a; 1981b). Other features of this information processing are less easily recognizable as reasoning because the "inferences" are associational, non-sequential and generally not disciplined by logic (see Hample, 1980b; 1982); nonetheless, they are part of what happens when people process arguments. In principle, this perspective on argument also includes the creative processes by which people invent arguments, even though we know far less about the psychology of invention.

An essential and unique feature of this sense of argument is its attitude toward the message. Most argument theorists view arguments (in either of O'Keefe's senses) as residing within messages, whether the message be a document or a conversation. For these scholars, argument is a public, textual phenonemon, and is therefore studied using speeches, essays or turns at talk as primary sources. But the textual view is not the only possible one. Several writers

have noticed that communication may be usefully studied as having several different loci (Kinneavy, 1971, esp. p. 348; Willard, 1976, 310; Fisher, 1978; Hample, in press). Arguments may be sited within the channel or message, in which case one is led to the conclusion that argument is essentially a textual event. The cognitive sense of argument, in contrast, locates argument within the people who are arguing. This theoretical decision de-emphasizes the role of the message in argument: "a strictly psychological perspective of communication would conceive of the message as 'created' by the interpreter; that is, the transmissional property of message is not necessary to conceptualizing communication within psychologism" (Fisher, 1978, p. 271). The only necessary role for message to play in a cognitive theory is to perform as a stimulus for the receiver's (cognitively-generated) argument.

In earlier papers, in fact, I have suggested that messages be viewed solely as stimuli. While that minimal appreciation of message is the only essential facet of text for most cognitive theory, I have lately come to realize that we should not ignore textual features on this account. Some characteristics of discourse reliably elicit certain styles of information-processing; for example, concretely-worded passages are commonly converted into mental images (Paivio, 1971). And, so long as we are cautious about it (see Greenwald, 1968), we may actually find clues to receivers' cognitions within messages. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 3) express an even more general consideration: "Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like." So message-as-merely-stimulus is a limited conception of the cognitive role of text, and full cognitive theories will tend to go further than this. But by its nature, the psychological perspective on argument involves a radical restriction on the theoretical value of the message; this will be plain whenever

the cognitive sense is compared to other accounts of argument. Such a constriction is inherent to this view, and is one feature which clearly distinguishes it from current understandings of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$.

I propose that this cognitive sense of argument be marked as argument$_0$. Such subscripting emphasizes the originative impulse of cognition, and suggests the foundational character of this kind of argument. In this essay, I will try to legitimate argument$_0$ as a distinct and necessary sense of argument. Since I expect that few would deny that this sense is clearly different from both argument$_1$ and argument$_2$, I will concentrate on exhibiting its explanatory value. To that end, I will first show that it appears in several important theories of argument. Then I will reconsider the original O'Keefe/Brockriede exchange which introduced the two senses into our literature. In that second section I hope to establish that O'Keefe's critique of Brockriede would have been improved by recourse to argument$_0$. Finally, I will examine the role of argument$_0$ in the Jackson/Jacobs research program. Their work was chosen partly because of its present importance, and partly because of its occasionally explicit opposition to a cognitive sense of argument. Their objections will be considered in the context of their own interpretive work.

As a final preliminary, perhaps it is as well to say explicitly that I do not propose argument$_0$ as a substitute for any current senses of argument; nor is it my purpose to challenge the justice of distinguishing argument$_1$ from argument$_2$. I only hope to build a case for adding argument$_0$ to our emerging consensus about the senses of argument. I will try to accomplish that task by showing that argument$_0$ is essential to theories other than my own, and by indicating that our overall appreciation of argument would be enhanced by use of argument$_0$.

Argumentation Theories Which Involve Argument$_0$

My reading of several argumentation theories reveals some important roles for argument$_0$. This sense of argument is more fundamental in some systems than in others, but it is frequently essential to the coherence of a theory. One caveat is worth offering: my claim that argument$_0$ is important to a particular theory does not imply that it is the only sense of argument used by the theorist. A theory using a single sense of argument would be rare, and I have no intention of trying to prove that argument$_0$ is the only reasonable way to understand argument.

Argument$_0$ appears prominently in Plato's rhetorical theory. Near the conclusion of the Phaedrus (271-272), Socrates consents to tell Phaedrus "how one ought to compose if he means to be as scientific as possible" in constructing a rhetorical theory: "the intending orator must know what types of soul there are," and must learn to match kinds of hearer with kinds of speech. The orator will learn such things theoretically in school, but this is not enough. He must make persuasion practical by careful empirical observation of its effects on men's souls: "he must watch it actually occurring, exemplified in men's conduct, and must cultivate a keenness of perception in following it, if he is to get any advantage out the previous instruction. . ." This combination of education and experience will enable the orator to say, "'that character now actually before me is the one I heard about in school, and in order to persuade him of so-and-so I have to apply these arguments in this fashion. . .'" Surely it is plain that Plato's program requires the student to understand the cognitive mechanisms (the "soul") by which the audience will process the argument. To have an understanding of this process is to actualize a cognitive view of argument. Argument$_0$ is therefore present in Plato's rhetoric; its importance in the theory is shown by the fact that it derives from the very

function of oratory--"to influence men's souls." Plato's view of argument is not wholly cognitive, since he also insists that oratory be based in truth, and that it be designed to please the gods (273-274). Nonetheless, $argument_0$ is pivotal in his rhetoric.

Aristotle, too, makes use of a conception of argument similar to $argument_0$. Like Plato, Aristotle insists that his students learn about psychology. Book II of the Rhetoric includes a long list of emotions about which the rhetor is enjoined to know the state of mind associated with each, the objects of the emotion (e.g., with whom does one get angry?), and the grounds or stimuli for each (Rhet., 1378^a20-30). The enthymeme, certainly a basic part of Aristotle's theory, is constructed with the audience's cognitive system very much in mind (see Bitzer, 1959): enthymemes ought to be simple because hearers have limited intellectual capacity (1357^a1-5); they must be based only on premises already believed by the audience (1357^a10-14); and familiar items may be omitted (1357^a17-18). Each of those properties is founded on knowledge of how the audience will think about the argument. In addition to this common receiver-oriented use of $argument_0$, we also find in Aristotle the rarer speaker-based application. Careful attention to the first two chapters of Rhetoric reveals that Aristotle did not see rhetoric-as-performance as his central focus. Instead, he seems almost exclusively concerned with thinking of arguments, in contrast to delivering them. He defines rhetoric as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (1355^b26, my emphasis). In speaking of rhetoric's function, he says that it "is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow" (1355^b10-12, my emphasis). Hauser's (1981, p. 4) recent commentary on these passages clarifies my point: ". . .when Aristotle tells us that the

function of rhetoric is to observe in the given case the available means of persuasion, he is indicating not merely the end of rhetoric, but what is unique to rhetoric. It is not an art of persuading but a habit of mind which realizes a capacity to find what in each particular case has the potential to gain adherence." This "habit of mind" is Aristotle's inventional use of argument$_0$. Surely we will misunderstand the Rhetoric if we cannot appreciate Aristotle's explanations of how arguments ought to arise in the mind of an orator, or how arguments are likely to be processed in the minds of audience members.

Modern theorists also use ideas much like argument$_0$. Willard, for instance, insists that an argument ". . .is a psychological phenomenon having no existence apart from the individuals who use it" (1976, 313). He points out that one might consider argument from any of three different perspectives: one such would involve "the processes occurring in the mind of the source which result in the verbalized claim;" the second would concentrate on text; and the third would describe "the cognitive processes of the receiver as s/he hears the argument" (1976, 310). The first and third of these are the audience--and speaker-based uses of argument$_0$ we have met in Aristotle, and are also those taken by Willard himself. He says, for instance, that ". . .the relationships between claims and the evidence for them is always psychological" (1980, p. 369), and reaffirms his cognitive orientation throughout his work. As with the other theories I am discussing in this section, however, I do not mean to be read as saying that argument$_0$ is the sole sense of argument Willard uses--only that it is essential to explication of his overall position.

Burleson's work also involves argument$_0$ at critical turns. He says that ". . .no utterance may be regarded intrinsically as an argument, for arguments are always construed in discourse by persons" (1979a, 146n30). His empirical work on children's argumentation (e.g., Burleson, 1980) concentrates

on the development of cognitive sensitivities, and so shows one part of the promise of argument$_0$. He comes close to expressing this essay's thesis when he remarks that ". . .understanding of both the act of 'making an argument' and the activity of 'having an argument' can be deepened by developing more sophisticated knowledge of human reasoning processes" (1981, 134). Burleson's papers, in short, are quite self-consciously cognitive in their orientation, and offer clear examples of the merit of argument$_0$.

In closing this first part of my own argument, I should mention that similar points can be made about the work of many other modern writers. The role of argument$_0$ is not always as obvious or important as in the theories just discussed, but it frequently has a secure niche. In the New Rhetoric (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969), for example, we find ourselves repeatedly reading about the adherence of the audience. "Indeed, the object of the theory of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent" (p. 4; compare p. 14). Given the Belgians' classical orientation, perhaps this sentiment is expectable. Wenzel, too, finds it expedient to explain argument-as-process in cognitive terms (among others). Within the process perspective, ". . .we think of the man as situated in the real world of social-political action, speaking to other persons so situated, for the purpose of influencing their attitudes, beliefs and actions. We conceive of his motive as persuasion, and our purpose in examining his behavior, its antecedents, and its consequences is to understand the process of persuasion" (1980, p. 115). Various of the words in this explanation--purpose, attitudes, beliefs, motive--require cognitive interpretations, and others--situated, influencing, actions, persuasion, antecedents, consequences--might be helpfully discussed in such terms. The following sections will also show in what ways I think Brockriede, O'Keefe, Jackson and Jacobs all draw on argument$_0$ in order to build their

theories. In sum, whether the place of argument$_0$ is a prominent one, as with Willard and Burleson, or a retiring one, as with Wenzel, this sense of argument continually asserts itself through the corpus of modern argumentation theory.

O'Keefe v. Brockriede

The historical occasion for the argument$_1$/argument$_2$ disjunction was O'Keefe's (1977) use of it to critique Brockriede's (1975) characterization of argument. I propose to review that pair of essays, and to show O'Keefe's analysis was flawed by the absence of an explicit sense of argument$_0$. It is worthwhile to begin by quoting the whole of Brockriede's abstract of "Where Is Argument?" He summarizes: "Argument is defined as a process whereby people reason their way from one set of problematic ideas to the choice of another. Based on this concept, six characteristics of arguments are identified." It foreshadows the whole argument of this section to notice first, that Brockriede's view is person-centered and at least in part cognitive, and second, that O'Keefe rarely appreciates or even mentions this. I will review Brockriede's six properties of argument in order, discussing O'Keefe's criticisms and offering my own on each point. After reprising their clash, I will consider some implications of argument$_0$ in the context of the argument$_1$/argument$_2$ distinction.

The first characteristic is "an inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a new belief or to the reinforcement of an old one" (Brockriede, 1975, 180). O'Keefe (1977, 122) offers only one sentence of commentary: "This first characteristic seems obviously to be a description of arguments$_1$." This is a revealing position, both because of its explicit claim, and because it seemed self-evident to O'Keefe. Readers will not be

surprised to learn that I think this first facet is mostly about argument$_0$: that is because I understand "inference" to be a psychological phenomenon. It is hard to know how O'Keefe evaluated Brockriede's person-centeredness, but he certainly ignores it here. O'Keefe apparently locates argument$_1$, and therefore inference, in text, for argument$_1$ "is something one person makes (or gives or presents or utters)" (1977, 121). More recently, O'Keefe (in press, p. 11) clarifies that an argument$_1$ "is something that is conveyed by some speech act." So for O'Keefe, an inferential leap must be public, and must be contained within or at least conveyed by a physically existent message. This position, it seems to me, requires a strained conception of "inference," one not "obviously" justified by typical professional usage. In response to O'Keefe, Brockriede (1977, 130) says only that O'Keefe's claim may have been a justified reading of the original paper. If I am right in my belief that the most straightforward understanding of inference is to regard it as cognitive, then it is clear why Brockriede's first feature characterizes both argument$_1$ and argument$_2$: it is because people are inference-makers. Argument$_0$ is the cognitive substructure of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. Aspects of argument$_0$ will therefore manifest themselves in both. (Of course, they each have properties which are not common to the other senses, and this is why the three perspectives are distinct.)

Characteristic two is "a perceived rationale to support that leap" (i.e., the one mentioned in characteristic one; Brockriede, 1975, 180). The rationale must be strong enough to justify attention, but not so strong as to make the conclusion unarguable. O'Keefe says that this feature seems superficially to refer only to argument$_1$, but that this simple association is complicated by the fact that "the locus of perception here is apparently the 'persuadee. . .'" (O'Keefe, 1977, 122). This locus leads to O'Keefe's claim that Brockriede has confused argument$_1$ with argument$_2$, as well as confounding

good (or bad) argument$_1$ with argument$_1$ in general. Both O'Keefe (1977, 123) and Brockriede (1977, 130-131) have plausible positions regarding these alleged confusions. For my purposes, the key observation is that O'Keefe ends up believing not only that a perceived rationale is not necessary for argument$_2$ (also see O'Keefe, in press), but further that a perceived rationale (located in the receiver, he notes) is characteristic of argument$_1$ (which, as we have seen, O'Keefe regards as documentary). Although it is reasonable to view "rationale" as capable of textual instantiation, surely a "perceived rationale" can only be cognitive. I would hate to complicate our literature further by insisting on the difference between "having a reason" and "offering a reason," but the distinction seems to be both clear and to have been overlooked. Brockriede often describes what it means to possess a reason (e.g., "A stronger rationale may justify a person's taking a claim seriously--with the hope that after further thought it may be accepted"--1975, 180-181), while O'Keefe seems to be thinking only of the public text (e.g., "But the persuader has still presented an argument$_1$ . . ."--1977, 123). Brockriede sometimes writes compatibly with the textual view, but he insists (1977, 130) that "perceived rationale" is an attribute of both argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. This is true, I think, because rationales are also properties of arguments$_0$, and so will appear in at least the participants and probably the text of either an argument$_1$ or an argument$_2$.

Third, says Brockriede (1975, 181), argument involves "a choice among two or more competing claims." A more self-consciously cognitive aspect to argument can hardly be imagined. Brockriede elaborates: "The right to choose is a human characteristic, but people are not free to choose without constraints. They are limited by what they know, what they believe, what they value" (1975, 181). Purely analytic developments allow no realistic choice about conclusions, and so Brockriede excludes them from the realm of argument. O'Keefe (1977, 123-125)

objects to such exclusion on the happy grounds that one person might regard an argument as analytic, but another might not--people adhere to different premises, and all do not reason alike. Furthermore, people may believe all the premises of an analytic argument, but may not have noticed the implication until an arguer points it out. Formally analytic argument, in O'Keefe's view, is perfectly useful in cases of both $argument_1$ and $argument_2$. Brockriede's (1977, 131) rejoinder clarifies his original position by underscoring the cognitive nature of choice: "the critical questions are (1) whether people who present or receive arguments put in analytic form perceive themselves as having a choice to make and (2) whether people who engage in the process of arguing perceive their interaction or transaction as centering on something about which they may choose." This reconciliation of views presumes that one may theorize about non-textual analyticity. This third attribute of argument is so clearly related to some sense of $argument_0$ that even O'Keefe, who has no particular interest in doing so, cannot avoid using acceptance, reasoning, belief and other cognitive terms in his discussion. O'Keefe and Brockriede concur that choice characterizes both $argument_1$ and $argument_2$, but this is difficult to appreciate without recourse to $argument_0$. The texts of neither type of argument will generally offer an explicit choice: choice is a condition of or a reaction to an $argument_1$ or an $argument_2$, but will not ordinarily be a public feature of either. Choice is uniquely a part of $argument_0$; only because of this will the conditions which allow or encourage choice be reflected in the public arguments. (A similar but more limited case of this type can also be made for properties one and two.) $Argument_0$ is plainly necessary to explicate what either O'Keefe or Brockriede has to say about choice.

Characteristic four is "a regulation of uncertainty" (Brockriede, 1975, 181). Uncertainty provides a motive for argument, and is inherent because of

the inferential leaps and the disputable choices people make. O'Keefe (1977, 125) and Brockriede (1977, 131) agree that uncertainty regulation is a property of both argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. Once again, argument$_0$ is needed to justify their conclusion. Uncertainty regulation is a function of, a motive for, a consequence of, argument. Since the uncertainties are necessarily psychological, the regulation (though it may well be stimulated by an argument$_1$ or an argument$_2$) must eventually happen within the cognitive system. People will weigh evidence, move from belief to belief, think about their choices, and decide on a behavior or belief. All the verbs in the last sentence refer to mental operations, and they or their synonyms are inescapable in describing uncertainty regulation. So regulation may not reside in a text, though it may follow from one. It is this effect which makes uncertainty reduction a second-order feature of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. It is only a direct, resident characteristic of argument$_0$.

Fifth, argument requires "a willingness to risk confrontation of a claim with peers" (Brockriede, 1975, 181). O'Keefe (1977, 125) says little about this, except that it is "an attribute of the arguer rather than of the argument. . ." This seems evident (Brockriede, 1977, does not dispute it), and again points to the need for a cognitive locus of study. This feature of argument is of a different flavor than some of the others, however. It describes not part of the process of arguing, but something which preceeds argument (to a lesser degree, this is also true of uncertainty regulation, if we view it as a motive rather than as an effect of argument). This attribute is part of the psychological field within which emerges the (pre-speaking) decision to argue. That decision can itself be seen as an argument, <u>but it will probably never be a public one</u>. The information-processing involved in "willingness to risk confrontation" is pre-textual. This facet of argument, like the previous one, directly characterizes only argument$_0$. It is no more a part of the

public text of argument$_1$ or argument$_2$ than the developmental histories of the participants, though these may be equally relevant. We find the willingness to risk refutation to be associated with public argument only because it belongs to the cognitive substructure of argument.

Last is "a frame of reference shared optimally" (Brockriede, 1975, 182). How much two arguers have in common is judged by them, and is a question of their perceptions, not any objective facts of the situation (Brockriede, 1977, 131). Such judgment is obviously cognitive, and again unlikely to appear explicitly in normal public arguments. If shared reference frames are seen as a precondition for argument, then the observations I offered in regard to the willingness to risk confrontation apply here as well. It is also possible that arguers or listeners may evaluate their consubstantiality during (and as a result of) the argument. In this case, the judgment remains psychological, but is concurrent with the public presentation. In any event, the real locus of this attribute must be cognitive, and argument$_0$ is again a necessary foundation for argument$_1$ and argument$_2$.

Considering all six generic characteristics singly or together, argument$_0$ seems consistently useful in explicating the nature of argument. Given the usual conception of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ as public events or documents, argument$_0$ is necessary to display the humanness of arguing. This section has therefore been explicative rather than refutative. I accept the legitimacy of all six of Brockriede's "generic characteristics," grant their direct or indirect applicability to argument$_1$ and argument$_2$, and concur with O'Keefe's distinction between argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. My only purpose here has been to expand our understandings of these things. One last application of argument$_0$ in this context may illustrate its utility further.

My commentary on the properties of argument bears on the dispute regarding whether arguments$_2$ require arguments$_1$. Some authorities insist that

argument$_2$ necessitates either the exchange or collaborative production of arguments$_1$ (Brockriede, 1977, 129-130; Burleson, 1979a, 140; 1979b, 126 n. 52; McKerrow, 1981, p. 982). But other scholars claim that arguments$_2$ without arguments$_1$ are entirely possible, and have even offered examples (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980, 254-255; Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 119-121; B. O'Keefe & Benoit, in press). O'Keefe himself allows arguments$_2$ without arguments$_1$ as borderline cases (in press, pp. 9-10; also see B. O'Keefe & Benoit, in press, p. 11). Do arguments$_2$ require arguments$_1$? My resolution of the problem is this: Neither argument$_1$ nor argument$_2$ can occur without argument$_0$. That is, participants must process information in such a way as to make leaps, use rationales, decide on conclusions, plan utterances, and so forth. Whether, or how much of, this cognitive material is physically represented in the textual message does not affect the phenomenal existence of argument$_0$. For argument$_1$ to happen, a person must "make an argument"--generate a text--such that the text stimulates an argument$_0$ in the hearer (or some might wish to say, <u>ought</u> to stimulate an argument$_0$). And similarly for argument$_2$: those "having an argument" must share enough material with one another via their discourse to stimulate arguments$_0$. If the rationale or the leap or some other feature is absent from text, we have two traditional choices: we may judge the passage deficient and so not an argument of either kind, or we may judge that the missing characteristics were supplied enthymematically. The absence of discourse features associated with argument$_1$ may be partial evidence against the presence of argument$_2$, but final decision requires attention to the possible presence of argument$_0$ as well. Given the cognitive point of view, most of the previous claims and counterclaims on this issue are irrelevantly reasoned. Argument$_2$ requires only argument$_0$. This feature often, but not always, results in the presence of argument$_1$.

Having shown that the six attributes of argument characterize argument$_0$ directly and so manifest themselves in argument$_1$ and argument$_2$, it is time to

consider the role of argument$_0$ in an important contemporary research program which has declared its impatience with cognitive views of argument.

Jackson and Jacobs

Jacobs and Jackson have chosen conversational arguments as the focus of their research (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980, 1981; Jacobs & Jackson, 1981; in press). Naturally enough, their work centers on analysis of text, and even began with a plea for more effort to understand message content (Jacobs, 1977). They study collaborative argument--that is, the public cooperative production of discourse in such a way as to produce meanings relevant to the actors' disagreements. In fact, they define argument as "disagreement-relevant expansion of speech acts" (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 122, italics omitted). These expansions are the possible moves conversants can make once they are involved with an adjacency pair (e.g., request/refusal-or-grant). These maneuvers are principled; they derive from the various felicity conditions which allow a favorable response to the first part of the adjacency pair (such a felicity condition for requests is that the respondent must have the ability to perform the requested act). Jackson and Jacobs have therefore identified both a function and a structure for conversational argument: its function is to regulate disagreement, and its structure is speech act expansion.

Far from centering their work on argument$_0$, Jackson and Jacobs interpret the texts (and contexts) of conversations. O'Keefe characterizes their main interest as being "in the kinds of things that go on publicly, that is, in what happens overtly. . ." (in press, p. 28 n. 8). Their analysis is rooted in the structural features of conversation: "The production of argument, as an interaction or as an act, is a particular realization of general conversational principles" (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 121). Others also identify the Jacobs/Jackson research as dealing with the (more or less) objective facets of discourse: "This research strategy begins with some general conception of

discourse structures and defines or isolates arguments on the basis of general discourse principles; arguments have in common the actualization or operation of some particular discourse structure or process" (B. O'Keefe & Benoit, in press, p. 7). Possibly as a result of this public, textual orientation, Jacobs and Jackson repeatedly distinguish themselves from, and sometimes inveigh against, various psychological approaches to argument (1979, p. 2; 1981, 123 n. 15; in press, pp. 10-13; Jackson & Jacobs, 1980, 251; 1981, 77 & 90).

My purpose in reviewing their work is not to critique it or to suggest that they have made any genuine interpretive errors. I regard their comments on the psychology of argument as being essentially peripheral to their research program. I only hope to show that argument_0 is a useful and even necessary part of their conception of argument. I chose their body of work for examination because of its present importance, and because it will provide reluctant evidence for my thesis. I will first consider the substance of their research, and will indicate that it builds on a thoroughly cognitive foundation. Then I will review their objections to psychological studies of argument.

In beginning the demonstration that Jackson and Jacobs rely heavily on psychological explanations of public events, I must in fairness admit that they are quite aware of the limitations of a purely textual view, and unhesitatingly use cognitive constructs whenever useful. Consequently I can be fairly brief about this, and can generally let their own comments make the point.

In an early paper, Jacobs identifies the participants' interpretive perspectives as a key concern: "the interests, inferences and personal knowledge" of the actors must be heeded if researchers are to appreciate the participants' meanings for utterances. "It should be apparent that such [interpretive] frameworks must be <u>inferred from</u> the talk rather than <u>found in it</u>" (Jacobs, 1977, p. 2). To understand discourse, then, we must study partici-

pants' cognitions: "Conversationalists consult collections of socially, situationally, and personally distributed knowledge as a resource for making sense of conversation and as a resource for organizing conduct" (Jacobs, 1977, p. 9, italics omitted).

Nor have these psychological concerns evaporated in more recent papers. Jackson and Jacobs stipulate that their data may be textual, but their analysis requires cognition: "We begin with concrete instances of talk which natural language users recognize as arguments or as related speech events. From these instances we reconstruct the tacit knowledge by which conversationalists organize such events, and thereby provide a technical description of their activities" (1980, 253). Elsewhere, they express their programmatic goal in similar terms, as "a technical description of the tacit knowledge which enables any natural language user to recognize and produce the patterns displayed by collected instances of argument" (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 119). Their recent study of proposals requires understanding of the "relationships among belief context, sequential context, and proposal context" (Jackson & Jacobs, 1981, 86). Throughout their work, we find repeated references to "commonplace understanding of argument" (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 118), the "beliefs, expectations, and intentions" of actors (Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 124), conversants' "implicit theories of communication" (Jackson & Jacobs, 1981, 84), "interpretation and reasoning by participants" (Jackson & Jacobs, 1981, 78), and the "vast unreflective knowledge" actors must posess in order to argue competently (Jacobs & Jackson, in press, p. 35). These phrases are neither careless nor incidental. The Jackson/Jacobs research is as thoroughly cognitive a program as we are ever likely to see, in spite of its use of a particular kind of textual data. "As theorists, we can't begin to understand the meanings people find in others' messages until we understand the assumptions about language use they impose on others' messages" (Jackson, 1981, p. 1).

But if Jackson and Jacobs are as deeply committed to a cognitive model of discourse as I maintain, on what grounds do they object to other psychological work? In one paper, they offer themselves as an "alternative to the psychologization of the communication process" (Jacobs & Jackson, 1979, pp. 1-2). This comment is directed against speaker-centered psychological theories which give too little attention to the hearers. In such investigations the listener only enters the analysis covertly, as he/she is perceived by the speaker. Now this is hardly a telling objection. True, such studies (they cite, among others, Bitzer, 1959; Clark & Delia, 1977) do concentrate on the speaker, but that is reasonable considering these researchers' interest in invention. Invention is not all of argument; but by pointing this out, Jacobs and Jackson certainly have not indicted the cognitive perspective in general.

A year later, they described their work as a possible "replacement for the fashionable but inappropriate identification of argument structure with reasoning process" (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980, 251). We must not confuse "argument practices with the comprehension processes that make them possible. Just as the rules of chess are independent of the planning processes that allow people to play the game, so the rules of argument are independent of the comprehension processes that allow persons to see the relevance of data to claim. . ." (1980, 251-252). These passages reveal some odd understandings of argument, rules and chess. What can "independent" mean in that last sentence? Can one actually <u>plan</u> a chess move without knowing how many squares a pawn can travel at once? Now it is certainly true that the rules of the game are <u>different from</u> the players' plans, but that is a long way from the claim of independence. In fact, the plans must <u>completely encompass</u> all the rules as a strategic resource. And each move will be cognitively worked out before it is made physically. Similarly with argument: On the assumption that arguments are purposive and consciously directed, we may say that an argument must exist psychologically before it is

manifest publicly. Just as there are non-rule elements in chess planning, so there may be pertinent non-argument cognitions (our discussion of Brockriede's paper noted some motives and consequences of arguments, for instance). Argument$_0$ is a perspective designed to focus attention on the argumentative cognitions, and reasoning is the traditional name for them. So, is "argument stucture" the same as "reasoning process"? The answer depends largely on whether one means the structure of argument$_0$ or one of the public varieties. The reasoning process <u>is</u> argument$_0$, and so to know the structure of one is to know the structure of the other. Because of collaboration or personal editing, argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ are almost certain to appear in different language than their underlying arguments$_0$; if "structure" means no more than language or physical features, Jackson and Jacobs would be right in this respect. But structure is something abstracted from surface attributes. If I am right in claiming that there is a cognitive framework (argument$_0$) beneath public argumentation, then the structure of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ will be the reasoning which generates and confirms them. And I find support for this view in Jackson and Jacobs' own work, which relies on the presumed reasonings of the participants in order to explain the meaning of conversations.

Several other papers repeat the complaint about identifying argument structure with reasoning processes (Jackson & Jacobs, 1981, 77; Jacobs & Jackson, 1981, 123), but their new summary paper frames this position in a more sophisticated way. "[T]he identification of argument with reasoning overlook[s] the appearance of argument in concrete acts and interactions. . ." (Jacobs & Jackson, in press, p. 11). This may be true of individual studies, but it is not inherently true of the psychological point of view. The very subscripting of argument$_0$, for example, is an insistence on its relationship to public argumentation. They continue: "it also ignores the institutional structuring of individual cognitions" (p. 11). I have no idea why this is supposed to be so.

It is similar to a warning sounded by Siebold (1981), but he is much more inclined to discuss the balance between mind and society in various research, and he mentions some traditions--symbolic interactionism is one--in which the institutional influences on mind are certainly not ignored. Not every study of reasoning will deal with the effects of social institutions, but this again fails to damage the overall point of view. Next, we return to the topic of chess: "True, the rules of argument must be known by an individual to play . . . However, psychologistic theories ignore the way in which the game of argument is experienced as existing publicly and independently of individuals in the same straightforward way that the game of chess in experienced as an objective, social object that can be described in a handbook without any transformation into a system of cognitive processes" (p. 11). It is certainly right that performing $argument_1$ or $argument_2$ is an experience which has a character different from that of considering an $argument_0$. A psychological theory of (only) $argument_0$ might well ignore the experience of conversation--and would be justified in doing so, given its very limited scope. But having conceeded that much, what remains of the quoted objection? Only the claim that public argument can exist "independently of individuals," just as chess can be described without recourse to mind. One might, of course, ignore the cognitive sense of argument in describing public disputes, but that would sacrifice quite a lot of useful theory. As the earlier discussion showed, the Jacobs/Jackson theory would be incoherent without cognitive explanations. The chess analogy continues to be unpersuasive: can one really claim to encapsule the game just by listing the rules? What of strategy? Timing? Bluffing? Does the newspaper's listing of the moves in a championship match really explain what happened, or why? Though I am not a chess player, I doubt it. Lastly, Jacobs and Jackson object that the cognitive processes which underlay public arguing are not unique to it. "People bring to bear processes which apply to language

comprehension and problem-solving in general" (p. 11). Though I myself have no trouble with the claim that all problem-solving involves argument$_0$, let us take their assertion on its face. Consider felicity conditions for a moment. As we briefly noted earlier, speech act expansions are rooted in the conversational stock issues. But an argument (i.e., a disagreement) does not occur every time a felicity condition is pertinent to a conversation (for instance, Grice, 1975, can be read as providing felicity conditions for all discourse). Should we banish felicity conditions from argument theory on this account? Of course not. A theory of one phenomenon may borrow from theories of other things without sacrificing integrity. And if, after a diligent search, we can find no differences at all between argument$_0$ and, say, language comprehension or problem-solving, then we will have to decide whether (a) public argument follows solely from them, or (b) argument$_0$ has a broader range than we usually claim. But neither outcome endangers our use of cognitive theories (hence argument$_0$) to help explain public argument.

Though this section has perhaps been excessively detailed, I felt that my discussion of the Jacobs/Jackson work had better be close or absent. At any rate, it is easily summarized: argument$_0$ is essential to an understanding of conversational argument, and Jackson and Jacobs give no compelling reasons to discourage us from regarding reasoning as one way of studying argument. It is worth repeating that I do not dispute any of Jackson and Jacobs' substantive interpretations regarding conversation argument; I only object to some of their gloss.

Conclusions

My central claim has been that a third sense of argument is necessary to a full characterization of "argument." This third sense is hardly new--it represents our traditional interest in reasoning, and is the explicit research

object in several contemporary bodies of work, my own included. I have also shown the centrality of this third sense to the important work now being done by Burleson, Willard, Jacobs, Jackson, Brockriede and O'Keefe. The cognitive perspective plays at least a supportive role in theories generated by Wenzel and Perelman, and has clearly discernible influence in the classical efforts of Plato and Aristotle. In each of these instances, a refusal to legitimize cognitive understanding of the argumentation theory would result in confusion, distortion and superficiality.

By designating this third sense as argument$_0$, its foundational role is marked. Argument$_0$ is to argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ as the problem, program, data and processing of a computer are to the printouts. The weakness of this analogy is that it pictures public arguments as static texts, rather than the delicate growing collaborations they often are; but in spite of this shortcoming, I offer the comparison to underscore the private/public contrast which is the key to identifying argument$_0$. As my review of O'Keefe's original paper was designed to show, the unnoticed move from the public to the private domains of argument is a seductive and misleading temptation. It is seductive because argument$_0$ generates argument$_1$ and argument$_2$, and is manifest in both their structure and outward appearance; it provides a natural resource for explanation. It is misleading unless clearly labeled because private processes are plainly different from public ones. To describe public arguments as though they were nothing more than private cognitions constitutes a radical reduction of argument$_1$ and argument$_2$. Though there is considerable virtue in the effort to find the cognitive skeletons for the flesh of public discourse, we ought not write as though these are exactly the same thing.

Argument$_0$ is not a peripheral part of public argument; nor is it an epiphenomenon. We cannot generate coherent explanations of argument$_1$ or argument$_2$ without reference to argument$_0$. My discussions of O'Keefe, Brockriede,

Jacobs and Jackson are detailed examples of the way that the person-centeredness of our argument theories demands cognitive accounts. Cognition is not something we may leave to other disciplines: we cannot do without it. Our constellation of argument senses must include a place for argument$_0$.

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